Rationality (1964), Jonathan Bennett's first book, was published when he was thirty-four years old, and it exhibits the intensity of a young philosopher who is quite sure he sees a way to cut through a forest of dubious, ideology-ridden, squishy philosophy of mind and set a few things straight. Since the terrain he was scouting and clarifying was the same terrain that I was then embarking on, with similar ambitions, I read his book when it first came out through the dust and smoke of my own earliest efforts to conquer these topics. The result, I confess, was that I simultaneously misread, underestimated, and covertly absorbed much of what he was on about and then proceeded to reinvent some ofhis wheels in my own work without realizing it until years later. First let me lay out what Bennett took himself to have done in Rationality, say why that was such a good idea, and then go on to consider why, nevertheless, his book has not had the influence it might have had. I was not the only explorer of this territory who chose to find other paths to Bennett's destination, but here we all are, and a review of his book may con solidate the gains.
How many philosophers would tell their readers on page I that they were about to encounter the results of an "extremely ambitious conceptual inquiry"? Why does Bennett say that? For several rea sons, I think. First, he sees his analysis of rationality to be redoing a large part of Kant's project in the Critique of Pure Reason-but doing it right. Kant thought he was discovering synthetic a priori truths, whereas Bennett sees that he is doing conceptual analysis, an altogether different undertaking.
Second-and I can only surmise that this may have been a conscious intention on Bennett's part-he wanted to alert read ers to the possibility that his brand of conceptual analysis was not the then fashionable brand-ordinary language philosophy-but something much better, harder, more valuable. Bennett's book appeared in Studies in Philosophical Psychology, an unduly pres tigious series of little red books with gray-green dust jackets and red lettering that was edited by R. F. Holland and published by Routledge and Kegan Paul. The series' title was something of a mis nomer. Although all the monographs in it dealt with some aspect of the mind and, hence, at least tangentially with some aspect of psychology, only a few grappled seriously with any empirical theo ries or experiments drawn from the field or the lab, and most were explorations of the putative implications of interpretations of the meanings of ordinary language expressions about minds. Ordinary language philosophy-asid� from the handful of works of genius (by Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Austin) that launched the movement was in general extremely unambitious, sometimes even comically modest, a lot of precious and informal fussbudgeting about the nuances of meaning that could be eked out of considerations of "what we would say" when confronted with one everyday psycho logical phenomenon or another. The series might better have been called Philosophical Studies in Folk Psychology, but that term was not yet in use. A few of the volumes achieved a wider influence or at least notoriety-Malcolm's Dreaming and Winch's The Idea of a Social Science, in particular-but in general these essays were for ordinary language philosophers only, and with the dwindling of that school of thought already in the mid-1960s, Bennett had to contend with a problem of misperception. Yes, his book was in that famous series, but no, it was not an informal collection of observa tions about whether we would say of one bit of human activity or another that it was rational.
Bennett begins by considering two widespread and plausible convictions: human beings are much more intelligent, more ratio nal, than other animals, and the key to their intellectual eminence is language. The first conviction is, he thinks, beyond dispute, and this permits him to define "rationality" as "whatever it is that humans possess which marks them off, in respect of intellectual capacity, sharply and importantly from all other known species" (5). The sec ond conviction is not just plausible; it is-shall we say-congenial to philosophers, indeed to all thoughtful human beings, but this actually hinders our understanding of it, encouraging oversimpli fied dogmas, such as Only human beings can reason. Reasoning without language is impossible. Animals don't even have beliefs (they, unlike us, are mere stimulus-response organisms).
We need to know h � w and wh y "human talk" enables us to be so much smarter than the rest of the living world then, and here Bennett sees the task as constructing, bottom up, the path from mere animal intelligence to our kind of brilliance by a series of explicitly described and defended steps, starting with a conveniently humble example, the famously informative waggle dance of the honeybee.
He contrasts his strategy with the more familiar top-down practic e of philosophers:
One might set about answering this by supposing human talk to be other than it is in various ways, in order to see which suppositions did and which did not rob it of its right to be accounted rational. The course I shall adopt, however, is the reverse of this. I shall start with a kind of behavior which is not rational, and shall suppose it to be different in various ways in order to see which suppositions do and which do not confer on it a right to be accounted rational.
This anticipates Valentino Braitenberg's "law of uphill analysis and downhill synthesis" (in his brilliant little book Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology [1984] ), according to which it is easier to syn thesize well-understood simple elements or mechanisms into a larger entity, and predict and explain its behavior than it is to try to reverse engineer a complex entity to see how its parts contribute to its talents. Bennett sees three advantages to this strategy, the first of which is pure Braitenberg: "greater control over our material. It is just easier, confronted with indubitably non-rational behavior, to know where to start adding" ( 6). Second, there is less risk of being dis tracted by features of human talk that are irrelevant but are socially or emotionally important to us. (Bennett is an acute critic of the amour propre that can distort philosophical analysis of such top ics.) Third, "we shall avoid the temptation to take the question 'what is it for a being to be rational?' in the form 'in what does my ratio nality consist?' and to try to answer it by 'introspective thought experiment"' (7)-which had been the philosophical tradition since Descartes (and including Locke, Hume, and Kant).
So although he doesn't explicitly put it this way, he sees and endorses the virtue of conducting a resolutely third-person, not first-person, analysis of rationality. These three advantages make for what he calls "antiseptic virtue" (7). Indeed they do. The emotional and social implications of discussions of rationality are particularly hard to keep in check-witness the inflationary tendencies of the Pittsburgh school of"normativity" -and it is best, as B, ennett sees, to launder them out at the beginning, so that they can beJet back in only when they are called for. These are hot-button issues, and it is all too easy to be protective, when a more balanced inquisitive ness would be better. 1he strategy also minimizes the temptation to be taken in by the unavoidable practice of identification Having constructed his base camp, he proceeds to look closely at the bees. Their waggle dances clearly have the function of trans mitting information about the location of food from scout bees to others, and von Frisch has worked out a well-confirmed sketch of the system implemented. But do the bees understand the sys tem? Might the bee dances be more like shivering when cold or frightened (which can be informative to any -observer without being an act of communication)? The difference appears-to be that the waggle dance is in some sense conventional, not a purely physi ological symptom of inner state. There are problems, however.
The trouble is that the idea of a conventional association essen tially involves the idea of intentions and reasons: to describe as "conventional" the correlations between food discover ies and subsequent dances is to say that the bees have certain reasons. (14) Bennett goes on:
Now, I shall argue that bees do not in fact have reasons for their behaviour, and thus that their dances are not literally symbolic, and thus that the dances do not constitute language. (15) Here I think the main strength of Bennett's method is also its weak ness. As a piece of conceptual analysis it is hard to fault the claim that conventionality presupposes reasons had by reasoners, but this blinds him to the prospect of an intermediate position which is not readily articulat�d without a helping of initially counterintui tive innovation-a "move" that I have only recently perfected (to my satisfaction): drawing a quite sharp distinction between doing things for reasons and· having reasons for doing things. There are rea sons aplenty in nature (I call them free-floating rationales): trees do things for reasons, fungi do things for reasons, bacteria do things for reasons, and we human beings do things-sneeze, shiver, cough for reasons, but they do not (usually) have reasons for doing these things. Only reason��s have reasons for doing (some of) the things they do. Bees aren't reasoners, as Bennett demonstrates quite force fully, but that does not stop them from doing things (unwittingly) for reasons. Reasons, in these cases, are not just causes; they are rai sons d'etre, uncovered and endorsed by natural selection (Dennett,  forthcoming a, b) . Shivering when cold has both a complex physi ological cause and a reason: it helps maintain body temperature. The complex physiological causes controlling the bee dance are one thing; the rationale uncovered and promoted by natural selection for the bee dance is communication.
Consider a similar phenomenon, involving communication between members of different species. You have probably seen video of gazelles being chased across the plain by a predator and noticed that some of the gazelles are leaping high into the air dur ing their attempts to escape their pursuer. This is called slotting (or sometimes pronking). Why do gazelles stot? It is dearly ben eficial, because gazelles that stot seldom get caught and eaten. This is a regularity that can baffle. No account of the actions of all the proteins in all the cells of all the gazelles and predators chasing them could reveal why this regularity exists. For that we need the branch of evolutionary theory known as costly signali, ng theory (Zahavi 1987; Fitzgibbon and Fanshawe 1988) . The strongest and fastest of the gazelles stot in order to advertise their fitness to the pursuer, signaling in effect "don't bother chasing me; I'm too hard to catch; concentrate on one of my cousins who isn't able to stot a much easier meal!" and the pursuer takes this to be an honest, hard-to-fake signal and ignores the stotter. This is the free-floating rationale and need not be appreciated by either gazelle or lion. That is, the gazelle may be entirely oblivious to why it is a good idea to stot if you can, and the lion may not understand why it finds stot ting gazelles relatively unattractive prey, but if the signaling wasn't honest, costly signaling, it couldn't persist in the evolutionary arms race between predator and prey. (If evolution tried using a "cheap" signal, like tail flicking, which every gazelle, no matter how frail or lame, could send, it wouldn't pay for lions to pay attention to it, so they wouldn't.) These explanations in terms � f free-floating rationales are not reducible to explanations at lower levels, such as the molecular level, but it is also important to recognize that even though the explanation of why and how stotting works is from the intentional stance (in terms of what the lion is rational to conclude from the stotting of the gazelle), .the individual lion or gazelle need not understand the meaning of stotting for it to work.
By not quite nailing the distinction between there being rea sons and an agent's having reasons, Bennett misses the interme diate cases that naturalism requires, in order to account for the gradual emergence of function by the march of evolution and by the development of the individual. For note that Bennett's hard line on conventionality would rob young children of the practice of com municating. Children perform thousands of speech acts (or proto speech acts if you insist) before they show clear evidence of having reasons for what they say.
Still, Bennett's all-or-nothing approach has its virtues, since it permits him to imagine a series of distinct steps in the direction of turning the bees' behavior into properly rational behavior, and the fi rst step comes within a whisker of making the missing distinc tion: "we can say of honey bees that their dancing behaviour is cov ered by rules, but not that honey-bees have rules according to which they dance" (15). "Covered" by rules. He goes on to articulate the difference: "Apian dances are regular; human talk is rule-guided." He explicitly avoids the mistake of thinking that any behavior that has a complex explanation in terms of physical causes cannot also have "mental predicates" applied to it and sees the first step towards bees having rules. ( if not yet reasons): "For a creature to be correctly said to have a rule, it is necessary that it should be able to break the rule" (17).
How could this behavior be observed and confirmed? Long before Brandom and Haugelapd and the Pittsburgh school of normativity drew attention to the importance of the role of criti cism, Bennett sketched it out crisply: A necessary condition for this is that there should be a recog nizable kind of performance which a bee goes through if and only if it has just observed a dance, or a post-dance foraging flight, which it knows to be in breach of the rules. ( 18) As his use of the verb "knows" demonstrates, Bennett is now mov ing firmly away from the puritanical strictures of behavioristic language and acknowledging that he is going for a "structural" account that is both objective and naturalistic, on the one hand, and mentalistic on the other. He calls the behavior denial behavior acknowledging that it is not fully fl edged denial of the sort a human being can engage in, but it is on that path, a 'move from descriptions which are rules to descriptions which refer to rules."
But there are more steps to come. In turn he introduces and justifi es 1. past-tense and future-tense dance types 2. allowing the bees to talk of danger as well as food. 3. minimal compositionality (all the future talk shares a fea ture and all the food talk shares a feature, etc.), so that if you know the rules you can mix and match to compose dances that mean there was food at location x and there will be danger at location y and so forth.
These steps have the cumulative effect of getting the bees in touch with the reasons, making reasons themselves (via their "mental" representation) objects in the bees' cognition in the same way that food locations, fellow bees, obstacles, and the like are objects of their cognition.
Denial actions have some interesting properties. Occasions in which a dance provokes denials must be controversial, the deni als themselves subject to rebuttal or criticism! Why? Because oth erwise a particularly influential bee could single-handedly destroy the whole communicative edifice by just issuing blanket denials, a weapon of mass destruction: "the entire community of bees could lose its whole stock of reasons for any claim as the result of a busy afternoon's work by a single irresponsible bee" (68). The only way the criticism of a denial could have any punch would be if we endow the bees with something like the distinction between soundness and validity: "what we need is a kind of denial which is performed when and only when some bee 'knows' that a bad reason has been given for some claim" (58). And for this to be possible, that bee must have some appreciation of the fact that the valid form is universally valid; not just this one time but always. Now that would be one rational bee! The Sellarsian give-and-take in the space of reasons is given a derivational foundation in Bennett's thought-experimental exercise.
Eventually, having constructed this imaginary edifice of bee prowess, he reflects on what he has done:
Returning to the main thread of the argument, we must see where rationality fits into all this. All our prima facie cases of rationality or intelligence were based on the observation that some creature's behaviour was in certain dependable ways suc cessful or appropriate or apt, relative to its presumed wants or needs .... With the introduction of universal and dated state ments, there are canons of appropriateness whereby we can ask whether an apian act is appropriate not to that which is particu lar and present t? the bee but rather to that which is particular and past or to that which is not particular at all I plead nolo contendere, for it seems to me that, aside from differences in expository style and organization, Bennett. and I are not just arriving at the same conclusions (for the most part); we are doing the same thing. If Bennett has a theory, it is not-had better not be, for the reasons just reviewed-a theory directly about internal processes. The sort ofbehavioral evidence he relies on to anchor his claims simply won't carry theory that far. So his theory is, like my instrumentalism, a theory of ! 'conceptual structures," as he says. The methodologi cal difference I see is s�rictly in the format of presentation, with Bennett's theory being, like many other philosophical theories, "a system of definitions propounded and defended" (Shwayder 1965 ). I think the idea that there is a proper theory to be developed here is a philosophical fantasy. Getting clear about something does not always mean producing a clear theory of it-unless we mean something quite strange by "theory." ( 
